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DIVERSITY AND RACE-NEUTRALITY
Kenneth L. Marcus*
The most important, elusive, and misunderstood aspect of federal affirmative action jurisprudence is the requirement of ―serious consideration.‖
Before commencing or continuing race-conscious, nonremedial affirmative
action plans, public institutions, including colleges and universities, must
apply ―serious, good faith consideration‖ to workable race-neutral alternatives (RNAs).1 This requires not only that less racially intrusive alternatives
be unavailable, but also that institutions establish this unavailability through
a largely undefined process of ―serious consideration.‖2 The measure one
should use to establish this (un)availability remains unknown. In higher
education, since RNAs typically tout diversity, it is easy to assume that they
should be measured against their ability to increase the representation of
previously underrepresented student racial and ethnic groups. In fact, such
measures raise serious constitutional problems to the extent that they indicate that the actual goal of the RNA‘s is racial balancing. This Essay argues that because the only legally viable purpose for nonremedial raceconscious admissions practices are ―the educational benefits that flow from
a diverse student body,‖3 only direct measures of those educational benefits
are proper for ―serious consideration.‖ In other words, RNAs must be evaluated against their ability to raise actual educational achievement.
I. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE RNA REQUIREMENT
RNAs are programs that strive to meet diversity goals in a manner that
is not race-conscious.4 The requirement that RNAs be seriously considered
*

Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College School of
Public Affairs, The City University of New York. The author previously served as Staff Director, U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights (2004–2008) and was delegated the authority of Assistant Secretary of
Education for Civil Rights (2003–2004). An earlier version of this Essay was presented at the 15th Annual Education Law Conference at the University of Southern Maine and the University of Maine Law
School. Roger Clegg, George La Noue, Mark Weber, and various conference participants provided
helpful comments, but fault for any deficiencies remains with the author.
1
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–40 (2003).
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has developed over time. It began as a scholarly analysis of the ―narrow
tailoring‖ prong of the strict scrutiny test,5 and was introduced into affirmative action jurisprudence in Justice Lewis Powell‘s Wygant opinion, which
established that courts must ―give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a
nonracial approach or a more narrowly-tailored racial classification could
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative
expense.‖6 RNAs were transformed by Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor‘s
Croson, Adarand, and Grutter opinions into a separate, enforceable requirement that public and educational institutions themselves seriously consider race-neutrality before resorting to race-conscious measures.7 Most
recently, the RNA requirement has been institutionalized in the Parents Involved in Community Schools decision as an independent basis for striking
down affirmative action plans.8
The requirement is important because its enforcement is at the same
time both simple and complex. In many cases, an institution may ignore
race-neutral alternatives altogether and therefore be vulnerable to a legal
challenge, which is quick, simple, and cheap. This simplicity is in contrast
with other grounds on which post-secondary racial preference schemes may
be challenged, most of which are resource-intensive, factually complicated,
and politically sensitive. For example, a particular institution‘s admissions
scheme might be challenged on whether it more closely resembles the University of Michigan‘s undergraduate college in Gratz v. Bollinger or its law
school in Grutter v. Bollinger. This determination may require considerable fact-intensive review, subjective determinations, and a battle of expert
witnesses.
By contrast, if an institution has not even considered the use of raceneutral alternatives, a challenge by the U.S. Department of Education‘s Office for Civil Rights or a private litigant is more or less cut and dried.9
Since many institutions do nothing to meet this requirement, they are sitting
5

See Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of “Benign” Racial Preference in Law School Admissions,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 578–79 (1975); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 n.26 (1974); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
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6
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (Powell, J., plurality op.) (1986)
(quoting Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 578–79 (1975)). Specifically, Powell faulted the Board of Education for resorting to layoffs of nonminority teachers when the use of hiring goals would have been less
intrusive. See id. at 283–84.
7
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 237–38 (1995); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40.
8
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2760–61 (2007). For
a more extensive discussion of the development of this doctrine, see La Noue & Marcus, supra note 2
(manuscript at Part I).
9
While most analyses focus on the prospect of litigation before Article III courts, it is my observation that administrative action by the Office for Civil Rights is both more frequent and more important.
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ducks in the face of any potential challenge. In this sense, seriousconsideration cases are important because they are so easy for the plaintiff
to prove. In 2004, the Office for Civil Rights challenged a number of
school districts for failing to consider race-neutral alternatives to the use of
racial preferences in their magnet-school student assignment plans. If the
districts had actually considered RNAs, the permissibility of those preferences would have been a legally and politically difficult question; absent
this consideration, the cases were much less difficult.
The serious-consideration requirement, however, is not always this
simple. While serious consideration is clearly required, there is little guidance on exactly what this means. Although in many cases institutions apply
little or no consideration and the outcome is simple,10 when institutions provide some consideration, even if perfunctory, it becomes difficult for courts
to determine whether the consideration is sufficient. This is due in part to
the courts‘ failure thus far to adopt principles for the evaluation of diversity
reviews. Extrajudicial guidance on this issue is also limited, consisting of
one or two government reports,11 various trade and professional publications
by attorneys for organizations such as the College Board,12 and one law review article.13 Otherwise, the field is largely clear. The claim that one does
not even know what it would mean to ―seriously consider‖ race-neutral
programs has some justification.
II. THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS
For those who would apply the serious-consideration requirement
properly, the most difficult question is how to measure the likely success of
race-neutral diversity programs. If their effectiveness is to be evaluated, it
must be evaluated against a particular standard. Since many members of
the higher education community think of diversity programs as efforts to
increase minority representation, it is tempting to measure such plans

10
The President-Elect of the Association of American Law Schools, Rachel Moran, has confirmed
the suspicion held by many observers outside of higher education, that colleges outside of California and
Texas are largely ignoring this requirement. See Rachel F. Moran, Symposium, Of Doubt and Diversity—The Future of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 231 (2006) (―Despite
federal efforts to promote these alternatives, colleges and universities have not paid as much attention to
this part of the Grutter opinion.‖). Some prominent higher education attorneys have claimed in conversations with the author that some of their clients are taking this requirement seriously, but they have
been unwilling to name the institutions that do so.
11
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP‘T OF EDUC., supra note 4; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AFTER ADARAND (2005) at xi.
12
See, e.g., ARTHUR COLEMAN, SCOTT R. PALMER & STEVEN WINNICK, RACE-NEUTRAL POLICIES
IN HIGHER EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO ACTION (forthcoming 2008); ARTHUR L. COLEMAN & SCOTT
R. PALMER, ADMISSIONS AND DIVERSITY AFTER MICHIGAN: THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES (2006).
13
See La Noue & Marcus, supra note 2.
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against their ability to achieve this goal.14 However, an institution‘s use of
such narrow measures would likely indicate that its professed commitment
to multifactored diversity is pretextual. Alternatively, an institution seeking
the judicially approved educational benefits flowing from multifactored diversity would logically measure the success of diversity programs in terms
of their ability to achieve either multifactored diversity (indirect measures)
or the educational benefits themselves (direct measures).15 That is to say, an
institution might directly evaluate the extent to which diversity programs
increase intergroup understandings, break down stereotypes, etc., or indirectly evaluate the extent to which these programs foster the multifactored
student diversity, which is expected to advance the pursuit of these goals.
A. Racial Diversity Measures
It is natural for most higher education participants and commentators
to evaluate race-neutral admissions programs against their ability to increase the representation of previously underrepresented student populations.16 Exclusive use of such measures, however, creates significant litigalitigation risk since it implies that race-conscious measures are employed to
achieve impermissible racial balancing, rather than to yield the compelling
educational benefits that flow from a multifactored diversity. After all, the
measure of success that an institution employs can speak volumes about the
goals it is trying to achieve.
For example, in 2000 the University of Texas at Austin bragged that its
race-neutral Texas Ten Percent Plan had succeeded by enabling Texas to
bring its 1999 enrollment for African-American and Hispanic students back
to pre-Hopwood v. Texas17 levels.18 This was an impressive claim since the

14

The transparency of these efforts to achieve particular racial compositions is one of the worstkept secrets in academe. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State
Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 291–93 (2001); Kim Forde-Mazrui,
The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2332–34 (2000);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1042 (1998).
15
The concept of ―direct measures‖ is developed in Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 6 (2001). Roithmayr, however, develops the
concept very differently than does this Essay. For a discussion of ―direct measures,‖ in the context of
serious consideration of race-neutral alternatives, see La Noue & Marcus, supra note 2 (manuscript at
34–35).
16
See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 14, at 2346.
17
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
18
See Larry Faulkner, The “Top 10 Percent Law” Is Working for Texas, The Univ. of Tex. at Austin
Office
of
the
President,
Oct.
19,
2000,
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/faulknerstatement.html (link). These boasts may
come back to haunt Texas in light of subsequent developments. After the Grutter decision came down,
Texas replaced its percentage plan with a race-conscious approach, which is subject to a pending constitutional challenge in Fisher v. Texas, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Tex. 2008). In that case, an unsuccessful student applicant claims that Texas‘s current use of racial preferences is impermissible in light of
Texas‘s admission that it not only seriously considered, but successfully adopted, a race-neutral alterna-
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Fifth Circuit‘s 1996 Hopwood decision had barred the use of race as a
factor in student admissions.19 Based on Texas‘s public pronouncements,
however, it is clear that the program measured its success based on its ability to enroll African-American and Hispanic students, rather than its ability
to enroll students who exhibited the wide range of diversity-characteristics
(economic, geographic, political) which a multifactored diversity scheme
would seek. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable evidence that this ―racial
balancing‖ was indeed Texas‘s goal.20 While this goal has considerable
support within the academy, it is decidedly not compelling in the eyes of
contemporary affirmative action law.
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that, by itself, increasing racial or ethnic representation is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the use of racial preferences.21 Rather, the legally
cognizable diversity interest consists of an institution‘s efforts to achieve
the educational benefits that flow from the interchange of varied and opposed viewpoints and perspectives, as may be accomplished by admitting
students who collectively create a multifactored diversity.22 To judge a plan
exclusively against its ability to attract African-American and Hispanic students would imply a pretextual character to the institution‘s pursuit of multifactored diversity. To the extent that the educational benefits flowing
from multifactored diversity are indirectly measured by a program‘s ability
to produce such diversity, they must be measured according to numerous
characteristics, and not just race and ethnicity.
B. Indirect Measures
Some may choose to measure RNAs according to their ability to
achieve a multifactored diversity. In other words, racially preferential practices will be measured against the ability of race-neutral alternatives to succeed, more or less as well, at achieving the full range of diversity
characteristics which institutions seek as a means of achieving certain educational benefits. These diversity characteristics may include race and ethnicity only as part of a wider range of attributes that may include
socioeconomic, geographic, and ideological diversity, as well as a diversity
tive. Fisher, 556 F. Supp at 605–06. The Center for Equal Opportunity and civil rights activist Edward
Blum have made similar claims in a complaint brought against Texas before the Office for Civil Rights.
19
See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962; Faulkner, supra note 18.
20
See Faulkner, supra note 18 (discussing increases in the admission and retention levels of African-American and Hispanic students to the University of Texas at Austin since the Top Ten Percent Law
took effect). Michigan made precisely this point to the Supreme Court in Gratz, arguing that the ―purpose and intended effect‖ of Texas‘s facially-neutral plan ―is to achieve some measure of racial diversity.‖ Brief for Respondents at 13, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), available at
http://conlaw.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-516/02-516.mer.resp.lb.pdf (link).
21
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 314 (1978).
22
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
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of skills, interests, and experiences, and demonstrated ability to overcome
different kinds of disadvantages.
This approach is less likely to produce litigation than the narrower racial diversity measures but is also arguably less candid. In many cases, the
approach insulates diversity programs by concealing the social justice concerns that motivated their creation. In addition, for institutions that sincerely seek the educational benefits that flow from diversity—or at least claim
to do so—indirect measures are at best weak indicia of that ultimate goal.
Furthermore, absent unusual considerations, an exclusive reliance upon indirect measures may also appear pretextual. Why not measure educational
benefits directly if this is the motivation for diversity programs?
Even accepting that educational benefits flow from multifactored diversity, this does not mean that diversity attributes can serve as a proxy for
educational achievement. A program that garners the requisite diversity
may not capture the educational benefits that are expected to flow from it.
The focus should be on the extent to which various diversity programs are
able to translate educational strategies (attaining multifactored diversity) into ultimate goals (specific educational benefits). Unless the ultimate educational goals are immeasurable, there can be no excuse for an institution‘s
failure to measure them in any evaluation that purports to constitute ―serious consideration.‖
C. Direct Measures
If an institution‘s purpose in pursuing affirmative action is to produce
the educational benefits that flow from multifactored diversity—the only
permissible purpose according to the Supreme Court—then the measure of
that institution‘s success, logically, should be its ability to achieve those
educational benefits. Given the seriousness with which the Court treats any
form of racial preference, it follows that serious consideration of raceneutral alternatives must include an assessment of whether those alternatives can achieve the same (or equally worthy) educational benefits as a
proposed racially conscious scheme. In other words, to pass court scrutiny,
institutions must seriously consider whether the same level of educational
attainment believed to be available through the inclusion of racial and ethnic criteria in a multifactored diversity approach can also be achieved
through nonracial means. Despite its logical basis, there are two problems
facing this approach.
The first problem with the direct educational benefits approach is that
there is no broad consensus on what those benefits are or whether raceconscious actions actually achieve them—particularly when they are not
accompanied by active efforts to achieve intergroup student engagement.23
23
See Mitchell J. Chang, Nida Denson, Victor Sáenz & Kimberly Misa, The Educational Benefits of
Sustaining Cross-Racial Interaction Among Undergraduates, 77 J. HIGHER ED. 430, 432 (May/Jun
2006) (―[T]he research literature suggests that the educational potential of ‗diversity‘ is not reducible
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The extent to which even race-conscious measures have succeeded in attaining educational benefits has been widely disputed in the literature, as
the Court has more recently recognized in Parents Involved in Community
Schools.24 Even those who support preferential programs sometimes observe that racial diversity alone is insufficient to achieve educational benefits absent additional measures to promote active engagement.25 If raciallyconscious programs do not achieve demonstrable educational benefits, their
failure is not a shortcoming of the direct benefits measure; rather, this failure would suggest a deficiency in either the manner in which the programs
are designed and executed or the justification for the use of racial preferences. Some diversity advocates, however, have long insisted that diversity yields strong benefits in a host of areas, including both higher education
and the public schools.26 In Grutter, for example, the University of Michigan successfully persuaded the Supreme Court, based in significant part on
the work of Patricia Gurin, that student diversity yields important educational benefits. Specifically, Michigan argued that its law school‘s ―admissions policy promotes ‗cross-racial understanding,‘ helps to break down
racial stereotypes, and ‗enables [students] to better understand persons of
different races.‘‖27 Diversity programs must identify specific, demonstrable
educational benefits and determine whether their race-conscious programs
achieve those benefits more effectively than RNAs do.
Michigan‘s proffered educational benefits may serve as an illustrative
example. Suppose that an institution seeks, as did Michigan, to promote
cross-racial understanding, break down racial stereotypes, and enable students to better understand persons of different races. A less deferential
court might be suspicious of an institution that defines educational goals in
such racially conscious ways; after all, if the goal is entirely educational,
simply to the mere presence of members of underrepresented groups; rather, its value appears to depend
on whether it leads to greater engagement in diversity related activities.‖) (citation omitted).
24
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2776–79 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (―Scholars have differing opinions as to whether educational benefits arise
from racial balancing.‖). The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights also recently reached this conclusion in
the context of elementary and secondary education. See U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BENEFITS
OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 15 (2006), available
at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/112806diversity.pdf (finding that ―[t]here is little evidence that racial and
ethnic diversity in elementary and secondary schools results in significant improvement in academic
performance‖ and that ―[s]tudies of whether racial and ethnic diversity result in significant social and
non-educational benefits report varied results‖) (link).
25
See, e.g., P. Gurin, E.L. Dey, S. Hurrado & G. Gurin, 72 Diversity and Higher Education: Theory
and Impact on Educational Outcomes, HARV. ED. REV. 330, 333 (2002), available at
http://www.edreview.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/harvard02/2002/fa02/f02gurin.htm
(―[S]tructural diversity is a necessary but insufficient condition for maximal educational benefits; therefore, the theory that guides our study is based on students‘ actual engagement with diverse peers.‖)
(link).
26
This issue continues to generate considerable controversy. See generally La Noue & Marcus, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34 n.144 and sources cited therein).
27
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 246a) (alteration in original).
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then why should a college not seek the broadest range of cross-cultural understandings, the removal of all cultural stereotypes, and the cultivation of
better understanding of all people? Either way, however, these educational
goals are clearly measurable, as Dr. Gurin‘s expert report in the Michigan
case established.28 Institutions can measure the extent to which they are
achieved through different programs: student admissions programs, student
exchange programs, freshman orientation training, travel abroad programs,
ethnic studies courses, experiential learning courses, etc.
Second, a diversity program that achieves educational benefits without
increasing the representation of underrepresented groups may still be considered a failure within the higher education community (and by the institution‘s accreditors). It has been argued that most people form their positions
on racially preferential admissions at least partly on the basis of moral principle.29 For such persons, it may be unsatisfactory to consider only the direct benefits of diversity programs. After all, a pure direct benefits measure
may validate a diversity program on its ability to raise overall diversityrelated educational attainment even if the program entirely failed to increase
the enrollment of minority students. Diversity advocates typically support
higher education diversity at least in part as an ultimate end, not only as an
instrumental good. Alternatively, even if an institution is primarily motivated by the educational benefits, which it believes will flow from diversity,
it may still favor racial and ethnic diversity as a means to accomplish that
ultimate goal, based on independent (if nonpredominant) considerations favoring diversity. This second problem, however, arises from institutions
called on their bluffs about being motivated solely by educational benefits.
In this respect, the problem is merely a superficial—and improper—barrier
to implementing a direct measure approach.
Diversity policies are predicated on their ability to yield educational
benefits; it would thus be appropriate for the institution to adopt policies
which maximize the full range of benefits that diversity is said to advance,
not just those which align with social justice values which may be embraced by some portion of the university community. Ideally, this approach
will enable the institution to focus with undiminished concentration upon its
ultimate educational goals.
CONCLUSION
The serious-consideration requirement deserves much more attention
than it has thus far received. Whatever one‘s views of the normative desi28

See Expert Report of Patricia Gurin at § V.D., Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75321), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 9775928), available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/studies.html (discussing
the report‘s methods for measuring growth and development among college students) (link).
29
See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE
170 (2003); Kenneth L. Marcus, The Right Frontier for Civil Rights Reform, 19 GEO. MASON CIV. RTS.
L. J. (forthcoming Oct. 2008) (manuscript at 40, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).
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rability of RNAs, they are now deeply embedded in contemporary affirmative action jurisprudence. Since Grutter, it is now unmistakably clear that
state actors and federally assisted agencies (including universities) that employ racial or ethnic preferences (including universities) must engage in a
serious evaluative process to determine whether these preferences could be
replaced by effective RNAs.
Some may argue that any sustained explication of the Supreme Court‘s
serious-consideration requirement affords the Court‘s affirmative action jurisprudence a degree of literalness that it does not merit. Those who are
more cynical or more skeptical may not take the Court at its word, seeing
the serious-consideration requirement as mere lip-service to a traditional
narrow-tailoring element which has been rendered insignificant in light of
the degree of deference, which the Court afforded to the University of
Michigan‘s perfunctory consideration in Grutter.30 Yet it cannot be gainsaid that the Court has continued to give teeth to the serious-consideration requirement as recently as Parents Involved in Community Schools.31 As long
as the serious-consideration requirement remains a part of affirmative action jurisprudence, it has a potential bite which may be more lethal than any
other element of the strict scrutiny analysis. While many institutions apparently still ignore this requirement, or only perfunctorily purport to satisfy it,
they do so at considerable litigation risk.
When universities evaluate the various available RNAs, they must select a measure against which to determine their effectiveness. The most
obvious measure—their ability to maintain or increase minority enrollment—is also the surest legal loser. Other measures also have problems
which are more subtle. In a nutshell, if institutions seek the educational
benefits that flow from diversity, they may gauge their success either directly (by measuring educational benefits themselves) or indirectly (by measuring the diversity intended to produce such benefits). While indirect
measures may have features that are attractive from the perspective of some
social justice concerns, they are significantly less convincing as a means of
demonstrating compliance with applicable law. In the end, there is no substitute for direct measures.

30
31

See La Noue & Marcus, supra note 2 (manuscript at 13–14).
See 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2760–61 (2007).
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